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The Commercial Exploitation Continuum 
Phillip W. Goter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the realm of patent validity, patentable subject matter 
and obviousness seem to be perennially en vogue. Academics, 
courts, and practitioners alike dwell on these areas because 
they lend themselves well to legal scholarship and debate. Pa-
tent law courses naturally gravitate towards discussion of sem-
inal cases such as KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.1 and Bilski v. 
Kappos.2 Less often do courses delve into detailed discussion of 
the greater issues involving § 102(b) and its on-sale and public-
use bars3—even though application of either of these statutory 
bars results in an absolute bar to patentability, invalidating a 
granted patent. However, the greater issues—including an ar-
ticulate definition of commercial exploitation as a predominant 
factor in identifying whether an invention was in public use or 
on sale—are of extreme importance to innovators and those ad-
vising them, who seek to maximize their effective patent life-
time by aligning the market window, product launch, and pa-
tent filing. Considering parties litigate the issue of patent 
validity almost as frequently as infringement,4 one would ex-
pect more discussion of the absence of a cohesive approach to 
application of the public-use and on-sale bars with respect to 
                                                          
© 2012 Phillip W. Goter 
 *  The author is an attorney at the law firm of Fish & Richardson, P.C. 
where he focuses on patent litigation matters. J.D., The University of Iowa 
College of Law, 2011; M.B.A., The University of Iowa Tippie School of Man-
agement, 2008; M.S., The University of North Dakota, 2005; B.S., The Univer-
sity of North Dakota, 2001. The author would like to thank Andrew Dommer 
for his constructive critique. 
 1. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (concerning obvi-
ousness). 
 2. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (concerning patentable subject 
matter). 
 3. Patents, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 4. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical 
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 390 (2000). 
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commercialization and commercial exploitation. 
Contrary to the commercial interests of innovators, § 
102(b) of the Patent Act “encourages an inventor to enter the 
patent system promptly” by defining separate statutory bars to 
patentability that prohibit sales and public uses of an invention 
more than a year prior to filing a patent application.5 To de-
termine public use, the Federal Circuit currently asks whether 
the invention was accessible to the public or commercially ex-
ploited.6 As for determining whether an invention was on sale, 
the test is whether there was a commercial offer for sale after 
the invention was ready for patenting.7 
As the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence currently stands, 
the commercial-exploitation prong of the public-use bar lacks 
any coherent definition and is dangerously close to subsump-
tion by the on-sale bar. Take, for example, the Federal Circuit’s 
Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing decision, in which it 
noted that “[c]ommercial exploitation is a clear indication of 
public use, but it likely requires more than . . . a secret offer for 
sale.”8 Consider further the Federal Circuit’s TP Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc. decision that linked “com-
mercial exploitation” with commercial sale of the invention—as 
opposed to sale for experimental purposes.9 Finally, in Atlanta 
Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., the Federal Circuit de-
termined “[a]n offer to mass produce production models . . . is 
commercial exploitation.”10 This may just be careless wording 
resulting in conflation of commercial exploitation with being 
“on sale,” but the specter of commercial exploitation continues 
to loom as a distinct, principal criterion for satisfying the “pub-
lic use” prong of the § 102 bar. As such, it deserves a definition. 
With the passage of the America Invents Act (AIA), the 
                                                          
 5. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). Section 102(b) conditions patentability upon the invention not 
being “patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign coun-
try or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the 
date of the application for patent in the United States.”  35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 6. Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., 514 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(citing Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., 424 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 7. Invitrogen Corp., 424 F.3d at 1379. 
 8. Id. at 1380. 
 9. TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972–73 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). 
 10. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
011 GOTER_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:24 PM 
2012] THE COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION CONTINUUM 797 
United States converted itself to a first-to-file priority-of-right 
system with significant changes to § 102.11 However, the rele-
vant changes under the AIA apply only prospectively to patents 
issued on or after September 16, 2012.12 This leaves at least 
twenty more years during which patents could be litigated un-
der the existing standard. Under §102 currently, an inventor is 
entitled to a patent unless “the invention was patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or 
in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year pri-
or to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States.”13 In contrast, AIA allows an inventor a patent unless 
“the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to 
the public before the effective filing date of the claimed inven-
tion.”14 Note that the AIA does not relieve inventors of the on-
sale or public-use bars currently existing in §102(b), and so 
there is no reason to expect a radical departure from existing 
§102(b) precedent as courts begin to consider whether to apply 
the same bars—now residing in §102(a)—to patents facing va-
lidity challenges under the AIA. If anything, these cases may 
arise more frequently given the expansion of prior-user rights 
and the concern that they will encourage covert innovation and 
use.15 
To date, perhaps courts have not seen the appropriate set 
of facts, at the appropriate stage of the proceedings, to decisive-
ly clarify the issue. Take for instance an agri-tech company 
that creates a drought-tolerant hybrid seed that exhibits re-
sistance only to a new, environmentally safe pesticide. No 
doubt the company will want to patent this variation, but when 
will it apply for the patent? In order to commercially market 
the seed, application of the pesticide to the seed must receive 
                                                          
 11. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 102). 
 12. Id. at sec. 35. 
 13. Patents, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 14. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1). 
 15. See America Invents Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual 
Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 50 (2011) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, Member, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) (“[E]xpanding prior user rights will harm inventors who share their 
knowledge and discovery and reward those who choose to stay silent, keep in-
novation secret, and don’t contribute to the products of science . . . [by] effec-
tively put[ting] trade secrecy in the patent law with a powerful incentive—a 
royalty-free statutory license.”). 
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regulatory approval. Obtaining this approval requires gather-
ing field data. So, the company confidentially, and subject to its 
control, plants the seed, applies the pesticide, and gathers the 
data. These actions do not fall under the usual prong of public 
use, but if the activities are performed solely with a view to 
commercialization of the invention, is it commercial exploita-
tion?16 
As a second example, suppose a software company develops 
source-control and change-control tools, representing a major 
paradigm shift from existing tools, and uses them internally for 
five years during the development of its next-generation operat-
ing system. The company wants to patent the tools and market 
them because it has received accolades for the software-
engineering revolution sparked by the developmental success 
and resulting stability of its operating system. As we will see, 
use of the tools did not result in creation of the operating sys-
tem in the same way that practicing a process to manufacture 
products does, and so it is unlikely that this example would fall 
under existing caselaw finding public use through public acces-
sibility.17 But, is it commercial exploitation to utilize the soft-
ware-engineering management tools to produce software that is 
commercially marketed? 
This Article addresses the abject lack of a meaningful defi-
nition of “commercial exploitation”—apart from being on sale—
as a prong of the test for public use. First, this Article introduc-
es the Federal Circuit’s on-sale bar jurisprudence. Second, this 
Article discusses the public-use bar and its experimental-use 
exception while attempting to delineate between the two sepa-
rate bars. In examining the interplay between the commercial-
exploitation prong of the public-use bar and the on-sale bar, 
relevant Supreme Court decisions and recent district court de-
cisions are also discussed. Finally, this Article concludes by ex-
                                                          
 16. The answer is likely yes, due to language elsewhere in the Patent Act, 
but these facts have not yet come before a court. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1) 
(2006) (“[T]he subject matter for which commercial marketing or use is subject 
to a premarketing regulatory review period during which the safety or efficacy 
of the subject matter is established, including any period specified in section 
156(g), shall be deemed ‘commercially used’ and in ‘commercial use’ during 
such regulatory review period . . . .”) But, is “commercial use” the same as 
“commercial exploitation”? 
 17. Note that in this example, a computer-aided software engineering tool 
may arguably “produce” the software product, therefore the example points to 
the tools used to manage the development process. 
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amining circumstances found relevant to a determination of 
commercial exploitation. 
II. THE ON-SALE BAR 
To fully appreciate the current ambiguity surrounding the 
public-use bar, one must first consider the Federal Circuit’s de-
cisions regarding the on-sale bar. One district court acknowl-
edged that “there are differences in the analysis of the two 
bars: the public-use bar focuses on the public’s reliance on an 
invention that is thought to be in the public domain, while the 
on-sale bar centers on any commercialization beyond the one 
year grace period.”18 Even so, the Federal Circuit has yet to ar-
ticulate a substantive difference between “commercial exploita-
tion” as applied to the “on-sale” and “public-use” bars. Indeed, 
“[m]any decisions consider Section 102(b) without carefully dif-
ferentiating public use and on sale . . . . However, it is clear 
that public use and on sale are separate events and one may 
occur without the other.”19 
Section 102(b) bars patentability for inventions that were 
“on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of 
the application for patent in the United States.”20 In addition to 
“a policy favoring prompt and widespread disclosure of inven-
tions to the public,” the Federal Circuit has identified other pol-
icies underlying the on-sale bar, including “a policy against re-
moving inventions from the public domain which the public 
justifiably comes to believe are freely available due to commer-
cialization . . . [and] a policy of giving the inventor a reasonable 
amount of time following sales activity to determine whether a 
patent is worthwhile.”21 
In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court de-
fined the baseline test for determining whether the on-sale bar 
applies.22 “[T]he on-sale bar applies when two conditions are 
satisfied before the critical date. First, the product must be the 
subject of a commercial offer for sale . . . . [and s]econd, the in-
vention must be ready for patenting.”23 This Article discusses 
                                                          
 18. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 
272, 290 (D. Del. 2004). 
 19. 2-6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.02[6] (2010). 
 20. Patents, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 21. In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 22. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). 
 23. Id.; see also Preemption Devices, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 732 
F.2d 903, 905–06 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (defining the “critical date” as the date one 
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each of these prongs below. 
A. SUBJECT OF A COMMERCIAL OFFER FOR SALE 
The first prong of the on-sale bar requires a commercial of-
fer for sale or an actual sale. This trigger creates little hardship 
for patentees because, as the Court noted, “[a]n inventor can 
both understand and control the timing of the first commercial 
marketing of his invention.”24 Prior to Pfaff, the Federal Circuit 
applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine 
whether a “substantially complete” invention was on sale prior 
to the critical date—the date one year prior to application for a 
patent.25 Although not the issue before it in Pfaff, the Supreme 
Court criticized the Federal Circuit’s totality-of-the-
circumstances approach to “determin[ing] the trigger for the 
on-sale bar” in dicta.26 “While the Supreme Court has not ex-
plained what is necessary for a ‘commercial offer for sale,’ [the 
Federal Circuit] ha[s] held that two elements are necessary.”27 
First, there must be a “commercial offer” and second, the “offer 
[must be] for the patented invention.”28 
1. A Commercial Offer 
Noting “the importance of having a uniform national rule 
regarding the on-sale bar,” the Federal Circuit has held that 
determining whether a commercial offer for sale was made is a 
matter of Federal Circuit law, “to be analyzed under the law of 
contracts as generally understood.”29 Thus, the Federal Circuit 
looked to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Re-
statement of Contracts to define a “commercial offer for sale.”30 
                                                          
year prior to the patent application having been filed). 
 24. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67. 
 25. Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 26. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 66 n.11 (noting that the test “has been criticized as 
unnecessarily vague”) (citing Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1323 n.2). 
 27. Sparton Corp. v. United States, 399 F.3d 1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 28. Id. (citing Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 269 F.3d 1321, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 29. Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (noting that any alternative holding would mean that a patent could 
simultaneously be valid in some jurisdictions, but not others—which “is clear-
ly incompatible with a uniform national patent system”). 
 30. Id. at 1047–48 (citing Enercon GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 151 F.3d 
1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (noting that “[t]he UCC has been recognized as 
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The Federal Circuit has noted that “[n]either profit, revenue, 
nor even an actual sale is required for the use to be a commer-
cial offer under section 102(b).”31 In order to constitute an offer 
for sale under § 102(b), an offer must be one “which the other 
party could make into a binding contract by simple acceptance 
(assuming consideration).”32 
In contrast, communications attempting to “generate inter-
est” in an invention, by inviting discussion of licensing terms33 
or merely “[q]uot[ing] . . . a sales price to a potential distributor 
of a product that is not available for sale and distribution,” do 
not alone constitute commercial offers for sale.34 “[T]here must 
be more than an informational exchange of price information . . 
. .”35 Note that actually producing or delivering a commercial 
good is not required.36 Likewise, performance of the patented 
method prior to the critical date is not required so long as the 
commercial offer for sale occurred prior to the critical date.37 
Once someone—the inventor, his supplier or any other 
third party—places an invention on sale, the on-sale bar is im-
plicated.38 Thus, “even if a thief ‘stole’ the claimed invention 
and passed it on to an innocent buyer, the innocent buyer’s 
subsequent offer to sell still trigger[s] the plain language of the 
on-sale bar” because an inventor could easily protect himself by 
                                                          
the general law governing the sale of goods” and that Supreme Court decisions 
support consulting the UCC and Restatement “in the commercial contract law 
context”). 
 31. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 32. Grp. One, Ltd., 254 F.3d at 1048. 
 33. Id. at 1049. 
 34. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Atlanta Attachment, 516 F.3d at 1365 (finding that even though a pro-
totype embodying the invention was never delivered, it was sold where the 
manufacturer sent “an invoice for the machine (an offer), and [the client] paid 
for the machine (an acceptance)”); see also Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that where an in-
dependent car dealership violated internal procedures by offering the 1992 
Corvette for sale prior to GM’s model announcement, “the mere fact that the 
offer for sale was illegal or ineffective does not remove it from the purview of 
the section 102(b) bar . . . [even if] the contract was cancelable or changeable 
under certain circumstances”). 
 37. Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, L.L.C., 473 F.3d 1152, 1162 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 38. Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(noting that “the text of section 102(b) itself makes no room for a ‘supplier’ ex-
ception”). 
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promptly “filing a patent application within the one-year dead-
line.”39 Underlying such a result is the “primary policy” of the 
on-sale bar namely, encouraging inventors “to enter the patent 
system promptly.”40 Thus, an inventor’s own prior, secret com-
mercial use implicates the statutory bar,41 as do secret “sales 
for the purpose of the commercial stockpiling of an invention.”42 
Generally, the on-sale bar precludes patenting a process 
that the patentee has actually used—overtly or covertly—to 
produce a commercialized product.43 “In contrast, if the product 
were sold by one other than the patentee, and the process of 
making remained unknown, then sale of the product would not 
pose a statutory bar to a claim on the process.”44 Notice we al-
ready encounter commingling of the separate on-sale and pub-
lic-use bars—in Woodland Trust, the irrigation system was 
never alleged to be “on sale” but rather was challenged as in 
public use because it was allegedly used to preserve the flora 
offered for sale at several greenhouses.45 Of course, performing 
a process for consideration would likewise trigger the on-sale 
bar.46 
                                                          
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1357 (quoting Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 
F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that the on-sale bar is intended to promote “prompt 
and widespread disclosure of inventions to the public”). 
 41. Woodland Trust, 148 F.3d at 1370. 
 42. Special Devices, Inc., 270 F.3d at 1357 (finding the patentee’s contract 
“to have the patent’s commercial embodiment mass-produced more than one 
year before it filed a patent application” implicated the on-sale bar). 
 43. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he issue con-
cerning the on-sale bar is not whether the process is physically represented or 
enabled by a written description, but whether the process has been commer-
cialized.”); see D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147–
48 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding that a pre-critical-date offer to sell a device, pro-
duced using the patented method, invalidated the patent). 
 44. TorPharm, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (comparing D.L. Auld, 714 F.2d at 1147–48); see also W.L. Gore & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“As be-
tween a prior inventor who benefits from a process by selling its product but 
suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps the process from the public, and a 
later inventor who promptly files a patent application from which the public 
will gain a disclosure of the process, the law favors the latter.”); Palmer v. 
Dudzik, 481 F.2d 1377, 1385–86 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (finding that the inventor had 
concealed his invention since he kept his method secret and the products did 
not teach the public anything about the secret method). 
 45. Woodland Trust, 148 F.3d at 1369–70. 
 46. Compare Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 269 F.3d 1321, 1328 
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In a case arising under the on-sale bar, the Federal Circuit 
considered whether an offer to practice a patented method to 
produce an output—the output to be provided to a third party 
in return for a commercial benefit—invalidated the method 
claim.47 The court determined that the on-sale bar applies to 
the secret use of software to generate an output that is subject 
to an offer for sale, even if the output is not patented.48 
Finally, the Federal Circuit requires that “a sale or offer to 
sell under . . . § 102(b) must be between two separate enti-
ties.”49 Whether two entities are in fact separate “depends on 
whether the seller so controls the purchaser that the invention 
remains out of the public’s hands.”50 The Federal Circuit has 
found a lack of common control, and thus separate entities, 
where a single government entity simply provided funding to a 
number of research institutions.51 Other factors to consider in 
determining whether two entities are separate include “the 
proportion of outstanding shares [of the company] held by the 
various parties; [the allegedly common entity’s] ability to con-
trol critical materials and products; and the terms of the Oper-
ator’s [sic] and Shareholder’s agreements.”52 Factors that are 
insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a common entity, 
include an unrelated requirement of mutual consent to man-
agement-employment decisions, a requirement that a distribu-
tor “use its best efforts to sell and service” products and not sell 
competing products, and a confidentiality obligation protecting 
one entity’s research and development information.53 
                                                          
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (invalidating a claim to a method for treating oil-refinery 
waste) with In re Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1333 (refusing to apply the on-sale bar to 
licensing of an invention “under which development of the claimed process 
would have to occur before the process is successfully commercialized”). 
 47. Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, L.L.C., 473 F.3d 1152, 1162 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 48. Id. 
 49. In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 50. Ferag AG v. Quipp, Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 51. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (finding that the Department of Energy “never exercised such control 
over [the research labs at Berkeley, Stanford, and the Super Collider], as to 
render all part of the same entity,” and thus a sale of an invention between 
two of the entities implicated the on-sale bar). 
 52. Ferag AG, 45 F.3d at 1567 (“Because [Entity A] could not control [En-
tity B’s] marketing of the invention, the two companies were separate entities 
for section 102(b) purposes and the transaction between them gives rise to a 
statutory bar.”). 
 53. Id. (finding that “complete management authority over the operations 
. . . constrained only by a mutual consent clause mandating agreement . . . for 
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2. Offer for the Patented Invention 
According to the Federal Circuit, “[w]hen the asserted ba-
sis of invalidity is a public use or on-sale bar, the court should 
determine ‘whether the subject of the barring activity met each 
of the limitations of the claim, and thus was an embodiment of 
the claimed invention.’”54 The Federal Circuit has held that this 
step “involves a comparison of the asserted claims with the de-
vice or process that was sold.”55 When “each and every limita-
tion [of the claimed invention is] found either expressly or in-
herently” in the product that was sold, the claim is 
anticipated.56 
In the case of a license to practice a process that contem-
plates sale of the products manufactured using the claimed 
process, the Federal Circuit held that such an agreement did 
not offer for sale the product of the claimed process.57 When the 
license pertains to patent rights, the on-sale bar will not be im-
plicated.58 But, where the process has been carried out or per-
formed as a result of the transaction, the on-sale bar may be 
implicated.59 
B. READY FOR PATENTING 
In Pfaff, the Supreme Court considered the issue of wheth-
er the on-sale bar is implicated when an invention is “on sale” 
but “has not yet been reduced to practice” (e.g., the item has not 
actually been made or the process has not actually been per-
                                                          
certain corporate decisions” is insufficient to demonstrate common control and 
a single entity). 
 54. Dana Corp. v. Am. Axle & Mfg., 279 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 178 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
 55. Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 336 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 56. Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
 57. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see Mas-
Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding 
that conveyance of production rights or exclusive marketing rights did not 
constitute a sale); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1267 
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that “an assignment or sale of the rights in the inven-
tion and potential patent rights is not a sale”). 
 58. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1330 n.3  (“[A] ‘license’ that merely grants 
rights under a patent cannot per se trigger the application of the on-sale bar.”). 
 59. See id. at 1332. 
011 GOTER_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:24 PM 
2012] THE COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION CONTINUUM 805 
formed).60 The Court determined that for the on-sale bar to 
arise, the invention must be “ready for patenting.”61 This may 
be shown “by proof of reduction to practice before the critical 
date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had 
prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that 
were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to 
practice the invention.”62 In arriving at this standard, the Su-
preme Court rejected an alternative suggested by the Solicitor 
General: “[I]f the sale or offer in question embodies the inven-
tion for which a patent is later sought, a sale or offer to sell 
that is primarily for commercial purposes and that occurs more 
than one year before the application renders the invention 
unpatentable.”63 It is also important to note at the outset that 
the invention must at least be conceived of prior to any offer for 
sale because “[w]ith no conception of an invention, there cannot 
be an offer for sale or a sale of that invention.”64 
Reduction to practice of an invention occurs when an em-
bodiment “meets every limitation and operates for its intended 
purpose.”65 “An invention works for its intended purpose when 
there is a demonstration of the workability or utility of the 
claimed invention.”66 While “an inventor is entitled to perfect 
                                                          
 60. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 55 (1998). 
 61. Id. at 66. 
 62. Id at 67–68 (noting that “the second condition of the on-sale bar is sat-
isfied because the drawings Pfaff sent to the manufacturer before the critical 
date fully disclosed the invention”); see also Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View 
Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he test for determining 
whether [an] invention is complete also requires proof that the invention was 
enabled prior to the critical date.”). 
 63. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68 n.14 (quoting Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & 
Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Bryson, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the result) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explain-
ing that this formulation does not account for “additional development after 
the offer for sale”)). 
 64. Sparton Corp. v. United States, 399 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(finding no conception prior to the offer for sale and thus no on-sale bar). Com-
pare id. at 1324–25, with Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d at 1313 (finding 
that conception, followed by offer for sale, followed by enabling internal disclo-
sure triggers the on-sale bar). 
 65. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 
997 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
 66. Id. (citing Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)); see Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d at 1313 (finding that an earlier 
commercial offer for sale, when combined with a subsequent, internal enabling 
disclosure may trigger the on-sale bar even though there was no proof that the 
conceived-of invention was ready for patenting at the time of the offer for sale); 
011 GOTER_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:24 PM 
806 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:2 
 
 
claimed features as part of reducing the invention to prac-
tice,”67 once the invention is workable or useful “an invention 
can be considered reduced to practice ‘even though it may later 
be refined or improved.’”68 
Like the public-use bar, the on-sale bar contains an exper-
imental-use exception which is unavailable where a commercial 
offer for sale has been made.69 The Federal Circuit applies the 
experimental-use doctrine to the ready-for-patenting prong of 
the on-sale bar and notes that there is “overlap” of the proofs 
required for experimental use and ready for patenting.70 
“[H]owever, the Supreme Court explicitly preserved proof of 
experimentation as a negation of statutory bars.”71 For in-
stance, tests conducted to determine whether an invention 
worked for its intended purpose are not “demonstrations” of 
workability or utility when the tests are part of an effort to re-
duce the invention to practice and work remains “to ascertain 
the success of the operation.”72 This is especially the case where 
                                                          
see also Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., L.L.C. v. Telesys Commc’ns, L.L.C. (In re 
Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., L.L.C., Patent Litig.), 536 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (“The question whether [a] system would work on a commercial 
scale is distinct from whether the system embodied the claims in the [] patents 
at issue.”). 
 67. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. 
Div. of Gen. Electric Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 68. Id. (quoting New Railhead Mfg. L.L.C.  v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 
1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (finding that a third prototype worked for its in-
tended purpose and was thus reduced to practice and ready for patenting even 
though the inventor conducted further testing, refunded the cost of the third 
prototype, and responded to suggestions resulting in production of a fourth 
prototype, closer to a commercial-ready product). 
 69. Id. at 1366 (finding that “once there has been a commercial offer, 
there can be no experimental use exception.”); see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 
Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (“Nevertheless, an inventor who seeks to perfect 
his discovery may conduct extensive testing without losing his right to obtain 
a patent for his invention—even if such testing occurs in the public eye. The 
law has long recognized the distinction between inventions put to experi-
mental use and products sold commercially.”). 
 70. EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“Like evidence of experimentation sufficient to negate a bar, reduction 
to practice involves proof that an invention will work for its intended pur-
pose.”). 
 71. Id. at 1352. 
 72. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 
997 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that a videotaped demonstration of an un-
certified terrain warning system deployed in an experimental aircraft was ex-
perimental use even though the proof-of-concept demonstrations supported 
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“documents show that the system was still in development at 
the time of the tests” even though the inventor “did not alter 
any specific part of [the] claimed system” following the experi-
mentation.73 Contrarily, showing that prior to the critical date 
the patentee “in fact performed the patented method for a 
promise of future compensation” constitutes obvious proof that 
an invention is ready for patenting.74 
Further, under the experimental use exception to the on-
sale bar, the patentee may engage in joint-research agreements 
or industry-development collaborations with the aim of reduc-
ing the invention to practice.75 These activities likely receive 
the benefit of the doubt because where multiple innovators co-
operate in research and development they are more likely to 
bring the patented product to market.76 For instance, where an 
avionics-electronics developer attempted to partner with busi-
ness- and regional-jet manufacturers to provide avionics elec-
tronics for their jets, the Federal Circuit found that a single 
proposal of commercial terms—contingent on successful flight 
testing—for supplying the avionics system did not vitiate a 
claim of experimental use.77 The Federal Circuit acknowledged 
the district court’s finding that “both projects involved experi-
mental aircraft [and] uncertified equipment”78 and noted that 
the avionics company “entered into these negotiations to facili-
                                                          
commercial proposals). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, L.L.C., 473 F.3d 1152, 1162 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that proof “that the contract itself required perfor-
mance of the patented method” is not necessary). 
 75. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“Generally cost defrayal arrangements between collaborators are not deemed 
to be invalidating sales, nor are payments for use substantially for test pur-
poses.”) The Federal Circuit noted that the public policy concerns underlying 
the statutory bar were muted in these instances because clinical tests and ex-
perimental sales “d[o] not place the invention in the public domain or lead the 
public to believe that the device was freely available.” Mahurkar v. Impra, Inc. 
(In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig.), 71 F.3d 
1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 76. See generally Phillip W. Goter, Note, Princo, Patent Pools, and the 
Risk of Foreclosure: A Framework for Assessing Misuse, 96 IOWA L. REV. 699, 
711–17 (2011) (discussing how standard-setting organizations, patent pools, 
and research joint ventures further public policy, competition, and consumer 
interests). 
 77. Honeywell, 488 F.3d at 996–97. 
 78. Id. at 996 (quoting Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionic Sys. 
Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 272, 295 (D. Del. 2004)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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tate its programs to test its new system with human pilots in a 
genuine cockpit setting . . . to determine that the invention 
worked for its intended purpose.”79 In contrast, “[a]n offer to 
mass produce production models does not square with experi-
mentation under any standard; it is commercial exploitation.”80 
III. THE PUBLIC-USE BAR 
The public-use bar of § 102(b) denies patents to inventions 
that were “in public use . . . in this country, more than one year 
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States.”81 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[Section] 102 of 
the Patent Act serves as a limiting provision, both excluding 
ideas that are in the public domain from patent protection and 
confining the duration of the monopoly to the statutory term.”82 
Because “[c]ommercial exploitation of an invention as a trade 
secret violates the policies of encouraging an inventor’s prompt 
disclosure and preventing the inventor’s exploitation of an in-
vention beyond the statutory patent term,” the on-sale and pub-
lic-use bars may function as a “tool that forces an inventor to 
choose between patent protection and trade secret protection.”83 
For instance, in Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing 
& Auto Parts Co., where the patentee used its secret process to 
recondition worn parts for its customers, the Second Circuit 
noted “that it is a condition upon an inventor’s right to a patent 
that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is 
ready for patenting; he must content himself with either secre-
cy, or [a patent].”84 Among the other public policy interests in 
play, the public-use bar attempts to provide “inventors with a 
definite standard for determining when a patent application 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 996. The Federal Circuit considered in its analysis that “Hon-
eywell did not refer to the new system as ready for sale.” Id. at 997. 
 80. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that a quotation for manufacture of 50 production 
units that according to the terms “became a contract with the signature of a 
purchasing entity . . . constitute[d] an offer for sale that cannot avoid the on-
sale bar via the experimental use exception”). 
 81. Patents, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 82. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998). 
 83. Andrew S. Baluch, Note, Relating the Two Experimental Uses in Pa-
tent Law: Inventor’s Negation and Infringer’s Defense, 87 B.U. L. REV. 213, 225 
(2007). 
 84. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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must be filed.”85 
In Egbert v. Lippman, the Supreme Court set out the “clas-
sical standard” for assessing public use of an apparatus.86 The 
inventor provided two corset springs for unrestricted, albeit 
concealed, use by a woman, who used them for more than two 
years before the inventor applied for a patent.87 While the in-
ventor received no commercial advantage, the use was still 
public where the inventor gave or sold the invention “to anoth-
er, to be used by the donee or vendee, without limitation or re-
striction, or injunction of secrecy.”88 The Federal Circuit ex-
tended the Pfaff two-prong analysis to public use in Invitrogen, 
requiring that the invention be ready for patenting and in “pub-
lic use.”89 The invention is in public use when it is: “(1) accessi-
ble to the public; or (2) commercially exploited.”90 
A. ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC 
Generally, “[a]n invention is in public use if it is shown to 
or used by an individual other than the inventor under no limi-
tation, restriction, or obligation of confidentiality.”91 Prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Pfaff, the Federal Circuit ap-
plied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate alleged 
                                                          
 85. Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (quoting Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65) (internal quotation marks omitted). Note 
that the on-sale bar functions similarly by allowing inventors to “explore 
[commercialization] of their invention before weighing the benefits of patent 
protection against the costs of obtaining the patent.” Frank Albert, Note, Re-
formulating the On Sale Bar, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 81, 101 (2005–
2006). 
 86. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 87. Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881). 
 88. Id. at 336. 
 89. Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1379. The court considered that the Supreme 
Court “noted that both the ‘on sale’ and ‘public use’ bars were based on the 
same policy considerations[:] . . .  ‘reluctance to allow an inventor to remove 
existing knowledge from public use’” and held that “[a] bar under § 102(b) 
arises where, before the critical date, the invention is in public use and ready 
for patenting.” Id. (quoting Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64). 
 90. Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., 514 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1380) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Id.; see also Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 501 F.3d 1364, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding public use in displaying the invention at a trade show 
prior to the critical date); Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (determining that a demonstration to two employees of 
an outside company without executed confidentiality agreements may consti-
tute a public use “[b]ecause the [company’s] employees were under no limita-
tion, restriction or obligation of secrecy to [the inventor]”). 
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public uses.92 Under that test, “[t]he totality of the circum-
stances is considered in conjunction with the policies underly-
ing the public use bar” and includes: 
[T]he nature of the activity that occurred in public; the public access 
to and knowledge of the public use; whether there was any confiden-
tiality obligation imposed on persons who observed the use; whether 
persons other than the inventor performed the testing; the number of 
tests; the length of the test period in relation to tests of similar devic-
es; and whether the inventor received payment for the testing.93 
In distancing itself from its earlier totality-of-the-
circumstances test post-Pfaff, the Federal Circuit nonetheless 
identified several factors to consider when applying this test to 
determine public accessibility to the invention.94 For instance, a 
court may properly consider “the nature of the activity that oc-
curred in public; public access to the use;”95 “confidentiality ob-
ligations imposed upon observers; . . . and the circumstances 
surrounding testing and experimentation.”96 
Regarding confidentiality and control, the absence of an 
express, written confidentiality agreement is not dispositive, 
especially where an inventor controls and limits access to the 
invention to observers with whom the inventor has established 
a relationship because in those circumstances “an understand-
ing of confidentiality can be implied.”97 Likewise, where an in-
                                                          
 92. Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); see Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67. 
 93. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“There may be additional factors in a particular case relevant to the 
public nature of the use or any asserted experimental aspect.”). 
 94. Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., 514 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 97. Id. at 1268. Compare Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 
1261, 1265–66 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that an inventor’s private use and 
demonstrations to “a few close colleagues,” including allowing his boss to use 
the invention in his presence, did not constitute public use because “the per-
sonal relationships and other surrounding circumstances were such that [the 
inventor] at all times retained control over [the invention’s] use as well as over 
the distribution of information concerning it” and the inventor “never used the 
puzzle or permitted it[s] use[ ] in a place or at a time when he did not have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy and of confidentiality”) with Beachcombers 
Int’l, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (finding public use where the invention on display to between 20–30 
guests at a party hosted by the inventor because the inventor “personally 
demonstrated the device to some of the guests for the purpose of getting feed-
back on the device;” and the inventor “made no efforts to conceal the device or 
keep anything about it secret. . . . [including] never ask[ing guests] to main-
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ventor disclosed his novel keyboard to “his business partner, a 
friend, potential investors, and a typing tester” but the key-
board was not configured to be used for its intended purpose 
(connected as an input device to a computer) except for a one 
time typing test [to assess typing speed], the invention was not 
found to be in public use.98 In reversing the district court on the 
issue of public use, the Federal Circuit looked to evidence that 
the typing tester had signed a non-disclosure agreement, that 
no record of continued use existed, and “[a]ll disclosures, except 
for the one-time typing test, only provided a visual view of the 
new keyboard design without any disclosure of the [actual in-
vention].”99 Thus, the Federal Circuit found the “disclosures 
visually displayed the keyboard design without putting it into 
use” for its intended purpose.100 
When an inventor fails to either control or ensure confiden-
tiality of its invention, public-use may be found “regardless of 
how little the public may have learned about the invention.”101 
In the context of an industry collaboration leading to an inven-
tion where non-inventor employees of one of the collaborators 
worked on developing the invention into a commercial system, 
such access may be considered public use—especially where the 
“access [to the invention] was not by an inventor and not pro-
tected by an obligation of secrecy to [the other industry collabo-
rator].”102 Similarly, use of a drilling method “at a commercial 
jobsite on public land on the side of an interstate highway” by 
those other than the inventor—and not under his control—is a 
public use, even if the claimed method was being performed 
outside of his control to test another invention (a drill bit) that 
the inventor did retain control of.103 
Equivalent to the on-sale bar, “an inventor’s own prior 
                                                          
tain in secrecy any information about the device”). 
 98. Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 102. Bright Response, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 610, 617 (E.D. 
Tex. 2010). 
 103. New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1297–
98 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It is of crowning importance . . . that it was only the drill 
bit claimed in the ‘283 patent, and not the method of the ‘743 patent, that was 
being tested by [the inventor]. The method was successfully performed numer-
ous times in January with the first prototype of the drill bit . . . .”). 
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commercial use, albeit kept secret, may constitute a public use 
or sale under § 102(b), barring him from obtaining a patent.”104 
“However, when an asserted prior use is not that of the appli-
cant, § 102(b) is not a bar when that prior use or knowledge is 
not available to the public.”105 Also in common with the on-sale 
bar, the public-use bar requires that “‘the device used in public 
includes every limitation of the later claimed invention’ . . . 
[even though] the public use itself need not be enabling.”106 
Simply put, “the public use [must] relate[] to a device that em-
bodied the invention.”107 Thus, where a claimed invention is 
openly used by a third party, the patent of a later independent 
inventor will be invalid for public use—even though the use 
was of “high-level aspects” of the invention—because the public 
was already in possession of the invention.108 
Revisiting Metallizing Engineering Co., the seminal case 
on commercial exploitation of a process, Judge Learned Hand 
                                                          
 104. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370–71 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881) (finding 
an “inventor’s unobservable prior use was a public use”) and TP Labs. v. Prof’l 
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that “public use” 
may bar patentability “if the inventor is making commercial use of the inven-
tion under circumstances which preserve its secrecy” but finding no public use 
where a dentist installed an orthodontic invention in patients to test its effica-
cy, because “the dentist-patient relationship itself was tantamount to an ex-
press vow of secrecy”)). 
 105. Id. at 1371 (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 
1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 106. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1356 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (citing In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(noting that “there is no requirement for an enablement-type inquiry”)). 
 107. Id.; see also J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ( “[T]he question is not whether the sale, even a third 
party sale, ‘discloses’ the invention at the time of the sale, but whether the 
sale relates to a device that embodies the invention.”). 
 108. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“[T]he public was aware that [a third party] possessed [the claimed multiple-
institution feature] and . . . had been using [a system with that feature] to 
make travel reservations from independent travel agencies prior to [the inven-
tor’s] date of invention.”); see also Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 
U.S. 5, 20 (1939) (finding public use where a third-party prior inventor “con-
tinuously employed the alleged infringing machine and process for the produc-
tion of lead oxide powder used in the manufacture of plates for storage batter-
ies which have been sold in quantity” long before the independent inventor’s 
filing date). “The ordinary use of a machine or the practise [sic] of a process in 
a factory in the usual course of producing articles for commercial purposes is a 
public use.” Elec. Storage Battery Co., 307 U.S. at 20.  
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held that a patentee’s secret use of a process to manufacture 
products for sale to the public triggered the public-use bar.109 
The Federal Circuit endorsed Metallizing Engineering Co. in 
D.L. Auld Co. early on by invalidating a patent under the pub-
lic-use bar where the patentee performed the claimed method 
to produce samples for prospective customers and provided at 
least one customer pricing and delivery quotes.110 
B. COMMERCIALLY EXPLOITED 
The Federal Circuit has noted that “[c]ommercial exploita-
tion is a clear indication of public use, but it likely requires 
more than . . . a secret offer for sale.”111 As a prong of the pub-
lic-use bar, this commingling with the on-sale bar is unhelpful 
at best. When it comes to determining whether the invention 
was commercially exploited, the courts have provided scant 
guidance and quite circularly list “commercial exploitation” as 
an additional factor to consider alongside those indicative of 
public accessibility. 
The relatively recent Invitrogen case was a missed oppor-
tunity to shed some light on the bounds of commercial exploita-
tion as applied to the public-use bar. Instead, the opinion 
moved even closer to merging the public-use bar with the on-
sale bar.112 Prior to the critical date, Invitrogen used its 
claimed process in its own laboratories “to grow cells to be used 
in other projects within the company.”113 The district court be-
                                                          
 109. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946) (distinguishing trade secrecy from the competitive 
wrong of effectively extending the patent term through delayed filing). 
 110. D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1148 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (“[A] party’s placing of the product of a method invention on sale 
more than a year before that party’s application filing date must act as a for-
feiture of any right to the grant of a valid patent on the method to that party . 
. . .”). 
 111. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); see also Elec. Storage Battery, 307 U.S. at 19–20 (“A mere experimental 
use is not the public use defined by the Act, but a single use for profit, not 
purposely hidden, is such.  The ordinary use of a machine or the practise [sic] 
of a process in a factory in the usual course of producing articles for commer-
cial purposes is a public use.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 112. See Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1383 (“[T]here is no evidence that Invitro-
gen received compensation for internally, and secretly, exploiting its cells. The 
fact that Invitrogen secretly used the cells internally to develop future prod-
ucts that were never sold, without more, is insufficient to create a public use 
bar to patentability.”). 
 113. Id. 
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lieved that Invitrogen intended this use “to further other pro-
jects beyond development of the claimed process . . . [in order] 
to acquire a commercial advantage” and found that the use did 
in fact “generate[] commercial benefits.”114 The Federal Circuit, 
however, found no public use, accepting Invitrogen’s argument 
that “this secret internal use was not ‘public use’ . . . because 
[Invitrogen] neither sold nor offered for sale the claimed pro-
cess or any product derived from the process, nor did [Invitro-
gen] otherwise place into the public domain either the process 
or any product derived from it.”115 Thus, we are left with an ill-
defined spectrum of commercial exploitation requiring loose 
approximation between distinct, factually distant poles—
Invitrogen and Metallizing Engineering. 
In support of its decision, the Invitrogen court referenced 
dicta from TP Laboratories, which “identif[ied] ‘commercial ex-
ploitation’ with sale of the [invention] or a charge for . . . use of 
the invention within the confidential confines of the company to 
generate commercial benefits.”116 The Federal Circuit distin-
guished dicta in Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co. that “commercial 
use trumps secrecy” and noted “that Kinzenbaw is consistent 
with the basic principle that a confidential use is not public un-
der § 102(b) unless there is commercial exploitation.”117 In 
Kinzenbaw, according to the Invitrogen court, John Deere’s 
“widespread commercial exploitation of the invention was ‘pub-
                                                          
 114. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115. Id. Note that the Federal Circuit, as recently as 2002 (post-Pfaff), dis-
cussed the totality-of-the-circumstances approach employed by the district 
court. See Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“The totality of the circumstances is considered in conjunction with the 
policies underlying the public use bar.”). In Invitrogen, the Federal Circuit at-
tempted to clarify its Netscape opinion by moving away from that approach 
but discusses factors to consider when evaluating the two prongs of the public-
use test. Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1380 (“The language in Netscape . . . should 
not be construed to resurrect a totality of the circumstances test . . . .”). It is 
unlikely that the small difference in practical application of the two tests is 
material to the Federal Circuit’s decision. 
 116. Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1381–82 (citing TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Posi-
tioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972–73 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (“[A]n agreement of confi-
dentiality, or circumstances creating a similar expectation of secrecy, may ne-
gate a ‘public use’ where there is not commercial exploitation.”). 
 117. Id. at 1381 n.*(citing Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 
(Fed. Cir. 1984)). The court also noted, “[a]s the Supreme Court pointed out in 
Pfaff . . . secrecy of use alone is not sufficient to show that existing knowledge 
has not been withdrawn from public use: commercial exploitation is also for-
bidden.” Id. at 1382. 
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lic,’”—not secret or confidential and so it does not help define 
commercial exploitation as a prong apart from public accessibil-
ity: 
Deere’s sales branch, acting through local independent dealers, made 
the invention available to farmers . . . for commercial use. Deere in-
structed the dealers to keep the units moving . . . . In 1973, the farm-
ers used the planters for 1,000 hours in five states, and in 1974, for 
500 hours in 11 states. By the end of 1974, 40,000 acres had been 
planted with the machines . . . .118 
Discussing Invitrogen, one district court considered a very 
interesting set of facts involving an inventor’s alleged public 
use through commercial exploitation of his trading-software in-
vention.119 The district court noted that in Invitrogen the 
claimed process was used to further other projects but the in-
ventor “never commercialized the later patented process until 
after the critical date.”120 However, in the case before it, the in-
ventor was alleged to have privately “used his inventive soft-
ware for personal commercial gain prior to the critical date” by 
placing live trades in financial markets.121 Acknowledging that 
an inventor’s private use of his invention is permissible, the 
court opined that an inventor’s secret use of his invention to 
“trade for profit—to garner a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace—” may be commercial exploitation if those trades 
went beyond testing in a live market to ensure the system 
worked for its intended purpose.122 
Revisiting Invitrogen and its discussion of Kinzenbaw, 
questions emerge as to what extent marketing efforts, apart 
from uncontrolled use by others, can be considered commercial 
exploitation. In Moleculon, the Federal Circuit found, in addi-
tion to no public accessibility, “absolutely no evidence . . . of 
commercially motivated activity by [the inventor].”123 The court 
                                                          
 118. Id. at 1381 n.* (quoting Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389–90). 
 119. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 883, 898 
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (denying both parties motions for summary judgment on the 
issue of public use due to disputed evidence regarding dates but commenting 
that “eSpeed may well have the better of the argument respecting public use”). 
 120. Id. at 893. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 893–97. As the litigation progressed, the public-use challenge 
became less important due to insufficient facts to prove it, and so the Federal 
Circuit unfortunately did not have a real opportunity to consider the commer-
cial exploitation issue. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing the inventor’s failure to disclose personal us-
es of the software before the critical date to the PTO). 
 123. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265–66 (Fed. 
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commented that “[d]iscussion between employer and employee 
does not by itself convert an employee’s private pursuit into 
commercial enterprise with the employer.”124 Further, a simple 
inquiry into the process of submitting a puzzle to Parker 
Brothers’ for consideration was not commercial exploitation.125 
However, one district court has found that publishing an article 
in a scientific journal—touting the success of implanting the 
medical device invention and the subsequent benefit to pa-
tients—where there was “no indication from the article that the 
purpose of the implantations was experimental,” likely rises to 
the level of commercial exploitation such that the invention 
was in public use.126 
In sum, the question remains as to how directly coupled 
the challenged commercial activity must be to the claimed 
method. In both Metallizing and Plumtree, performance of the 
claimed method produced a product that could be marketed for 
sale.127 But, what about ancillary processes? Recall the example 
of a source-control and change-control system offered above. 
This system does not “produce” source code, but it does increase 
productivity and save the source-code developers time and de-
velopment cost. Further, the use of such a system is undetecta-
ble by the public, and the system itself is not offered for sale to 
the public. However, the system “further[s] the institution’s le-
gitimate business objectives”128 and provides a competitive ad-
vantage—but isn’t every action of a company performed for this 
purpose? Section 102(b) requires that the invention be in public 
use or on sale, and therefore a product that would not exist but 
for the claimed process should not invalidate that process, lest 
we stray too far down the slippery slope from the statutory text. 
                                                          
Cir. 1986) (quoting Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1420, 
1427 (D. Del. 1984)). 
 124. Id. at 1267. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Arrow Int’l, Inc. v. Spire Biomedical, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 46, 76–77 
(D. Mass. 2009) (noting that the article “characterizes the procedures as tests 
to evaluate the new product’s advantages and disadvantages”). 
 127. See Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, L.L.C., 473 F.3d 1152, 1162 
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Metallizing Eng’g Co. v Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 
153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 128. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (ex-
plaining that this is especially true where the activity increases the institu-
tion’s status or aids in talent acquisition). 
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C. THE EXPERIMENTAL-USE EXCEPTION 
The federal circuit clarified that “[t]he experimental use 
exception is not a doctrine separate or apart from the public 
use bar[;] . . . something that would otherwise be a public use 
may not be invalidating if it qualifies as an experimental 
use.”129 In addition, experimental use also negates application 
of the on-sale bar.130 The Federal Circuit enumerated several 
factors that assist the determination of commercial uses versus 
“bona fide” experimentation,131 including: (1) “necessity for pub-
lic testing,” (2) inventor retention of control over the experi-
ment, (3) length of testing, (4) payment, (5) “whether there was 
a secrecy obligation,” (6) identity of the person conducting the 
experiment, (7) “degree of commercial exploitation during test-
ing,” (8) “whether the inventor continually monitored the in-
vention during testing,” and (9) “the nature of contacts made 
with potential customers.”132 The “list is not exhaustive” and 
not all of the factors will apply in a particular case.133 Notice 
that commercial exploitation is among the factors, but here 
again, no meaningful definition emerges. 
Inventor control and monitoring of the experimental use 
are important because “the experimental use exception only 
concerns the actions of the inventors and their agents.”134 Simi-
                                                          
 129. Clock Spring, L.P. v. Wrapmaster, Inc., 560 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (citations omitted); see generally, Andrew S. Baluch, Note, Relating the 
Two Experimental Uses in Patent Law: Inventor’s Negation and Infringer’s De-
fense, 87 B.U. L. REV. 213, 220–28 (2007) (providing a historical overview of 
the experimental use exception to the public-use bar). 
 130. See Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of 
Gen. Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting the factors “simply 
represent various kinds of evidence relevant to the question of whether pre-
critical date activities involving the patented invention—either public use or 
sale were primarily experimental and not commercial”); infra Part II.A. 
 131. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 
(1877) (noting that experimentation consists of a “bona fide effort to bring [an] 
invention to perfection, or to ascertain whether it will answer the purpose in-
tended”). 
 132. Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (quoting EZ Dock v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (Linn, J., concurring)). Other factors identified include “the nature 
of the invention, . . . whether records of the experiment were kept, . . .whether 
the invention reasonably requires evaluation under actual conditions of use, . . 
. [and] whether testing was systematically performed.” Id. (quoting EZ Dock, 
276 F.3d at 1357). 
 133. Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 417 F.3d at 1213. 
 134. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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lar to its application in the public accessibility context, whether 
the inventor retains control over the experimental use may be 
dispositive in some instances, especially where an inventor 
claims a sale for experimental use but does not “perform the 
testing . . . [or] have control over the alleged testing.”135 Addi-
tionally, an inventor’s failure to maintain records related to 
testing of the invention weighs against a finding of experi-
mental use.136 
When considering the nature of contacts with potential 
customers and the nature of the payment for experimental use 
of an invention, notifying customers of the experimental nature 
of the product being sold is critical. Applying these factors, the 
court has noted that “[w]hether payment is made for the device 
is an important factual consideration, but the fact that a com-
pany paid for the use of patentee’s device is not dispositive.”137 
However, “[i]f an inventor fails to communicate to a customer 
that the sale of the invention was made in pursuit of experi-
mentation, then the customer, as well as the general public, 
can only view the sale as a normal commercial transaction.”138 
Thus, as experimentation factors, control and customer aware-
ness are “critical” and “ordinarily must be proven if experimen-
tation is to be found.”139 
Not on the list but critical nonetheless, the Federal Circuit 
has made clear “that experimental use cannot negate a public 
use when it is shown that the invention was reduced to practice 
before the experimental use.”140 As discussed in Part II.B, re-
duction to practice occurs at the point when an inventor “con-
struct[s] an embodiment or perform[s] a process that [meets] all 
the limitations” and “determine[s] that the invention [will] 
work for its intended purpose.”141 Therefore, evidence of exper-
imentation includes “tests needed to convince [an inventor] that 
the invention is capable of performing its intended purpose in 
                                                          
 135. Id. (“While we have held that control may not be the lodestar test in 
all cases, we have also said that it is important, and sometimes dispositive.”). 
 136. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321–22 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
 137. Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001); see also Atlanta Attachment Co., 516 F.3d at 1365. 
 138. Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 417 F.3d at 1214. 
 139. Id. at 14–15. 
 140. In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 141. Id. at 1373. 
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its intended environment.”142 Obviously, “[t]esting is required 
to demonstrate reduction to practice in some instances because 
without such testing there cannot be sufficient certainty that 
the invention will work for its intended purpose.”143 As a final 
qualification, the Federal Circuit recently noted that “there is 
no experimental use unless claimed features or overall worka-
bility are being tested for purposes of the filing of a patent ap-
plication.”144 
Even though experimental use generally cannot negate a 
public use where the invention was reduced to practice before 
the experimental use in question, a district court found no pub-
lic use where experimentation occurred after reduction to prac-
tice.145 In this case, field testing was used to debug and evalu-
ate the patented system.146 The inventors continued to modify 
the system based on experiment results and the version used in 
field trials was not the final version of the invention.147 The dis-
trict court cited Invitrogen for the proposition that “[e]vidence 
that the researchers were still conducting experiments of the . . 
. prototype is relevant in determining the precise nature of the 
activity that occurred in public” even though the invention had 
already been reduced to practice.148 The district court further 
noted other evidence of “openly experimental” use. First, re-
searchers were required to get approval from the university’s 
research oversight committee in order to use human drivers as 
test subjects during the field trials.149 Further, even though the 
details of the experimentation were not apparent to the test 
drivers, the drivers understood that “the nature of the endeavor 
in which they were participating was clearly experimental and 
[they] would not . . . justifiably [] believe the invention was 
available to the public.”150 Additionally, the court noted that 
“[t]he inventors never showed the drivers how the Back Seat 
                                                          
 142. Gould, Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 583 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
 143. In re Omeprazole, 536 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 
F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144. Clock Spring, L.P. v. Wrapmaster, Inc., 560 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 145. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Harman Int’l Indus., 584 F. Supp. 2d 297, 311 
(D. Mass. 2008). 
 146. Id. at 302–03. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 311 (citing Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 
1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 149. Id. at 312. 
 150. Id. 
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Driver system worked, and the drivers were exposed to the 
workings of the system only to the extent that it was necessary 
to test it.”151 Finally, the public, viewing the prototype vehicle 
from the street, was unable to see that the test drivers were us-
ing the Back Seat Driver system.152 
Experimentation to resolve potential issues with commer-
cialization of the invention is not covered under the experi-
mental-use exception.153 This raises an interesting issue when 
the invention requires regulatory approval prior to commercial 
marketing because the invention must be used sufficiently to 
determine its safety and efficacy—the use creating public 
knowledge of the invention and fueling market demand for the 
product.154 In Omeprazole, the Federal Circuit considered 
whether a pharmaceutical was reduced to practice prior to 
Phase III clinical trials.155 In determining that the clinical tri-
als constituted experimental use, the Federal Circuit noted 
that in vivo testing as part of the clinical trials was necessary 
to proving the formulation worked for its intended purpose 
even though the inventors suspected their formulation would 
be successful based on laboratory testing.156 Revisiting Honey-
well, which also required regulatory approval of its avionics in-
vention, even publicizing experimentation with an invention 
does not vitiate the claimed experimental use.157 The Federal 
Circuit affirmed that Honeywell’s demonstrations to the avia-
tion industry were experimental even though they “did not al-
ways relate to claimed features” because all of the demonstra-
tions involved the invention’s intended use as an in-flight 
                                                          
 151. Id. at 313. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., L.L.C. v. Telesys Commc’ns, L.L.C. (In 
re Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., L.L.C.. Patent Litig.), 536 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (rejecting the inventor’s testimony that the invention was not ready 
for patenting because it “would not scale for commercial use”). 
 154. See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 
982, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Although these [test] flights allowed contact with 
potential customers, there is no evidence that they were solely or primarily for 
marketing purposes.”). 
 155. In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1372 (upholding the 
district court’s factual finding that “the claimed formulation was not reduced 
to practice before the clinical trials were completed . . . .”). 
 156. Id. at 1373–74. 
 157. Honeywell Int’l, 488 F.3d at 998 (finding that even though a “reporter 
published an article . . . about [the test] flight . . . he indicated the system was 
still under development”). See infra Part II.B. 
011 GOTER_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:24 PM 
2012] THE COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION CONTINUUM 821 
avionics system.158 
Regarding sales incident to experimentation, “[t]he law has 
long recognized a distinction between experimental usage and 
commercial exploitation of an invention.”159 “Any attempt to 
use [an invention] for a profit, and not by way of experiment . . . 
deprive[s] the inventor of his right to a patent” when that use 
occurs prior to the critical date.160 However, an inventor may 
charge another for their experimental use of his invention.161 In 
such instances the determining question is “whether the pri-
mary purpose of the offers and sales was to conduct experimen-
tation.”162 In other words, sales during the experimental phase 
must be “merely incidental to the primary purpose of experi-
mentation.”163 The Federal Circuit often looks to the amount of 
payment for the invention relative to the product’s later market 
price.164 In allowing sales and contact with potential customers 
during experimentation, the Federal Circuit has noted that 
“[c]ommercial purpose underlies virtually every contact be-
tween inventor and potential customer” and so customer con-
tact for purposes of experimentation “does not convert an oth-
erwise experimental purpose into a public use.”165 However, 
                                                          
 158. Id. (noting that testing is permitted “to determine the workability of 
an invention even if the claims do not expressly set forth the intended use un-
der examination”). 
 159. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) 
 160. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 
(1877); see also Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1576 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he absence of payment supports the inference that the 
tests were for the benefit of the patentee, and thus contravenes the inference 
of public use for or by the potential customer.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 
1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 162. Atlanta Attachment Co., 516 F.3d at 1365; see also TP Labs. Inc. v. 
Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that some 
other factors, such as “expression by an inventor of his subjective intent to ex-
periment,” particularly after institution of litigation, are not very helpful). 
 163. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1185 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). The court attempted to clarify the issue: “There are not, how-
ever, two separable issues, i.e., ‘Was the invention on sale?’ and then, ‘Was the 
sale an experimental use?’ The correct statement of the sole issue is ‘Was the 
invention on sale within the meaning of section 102(b)?’” Id. at 1185 n.3. 
 164. See Mark Levy, An Analysis of the On Sale Bar and Its Impact on the 
Structure and Negotiation of Development Agreements, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
181, 198 (2004) (“A sale for full price may be viewed as a bar rather than as an 
experimental use.”). 
 165. Allied Colloids Inc., 64 F.3d at 1575; see also Paragon Podiatry Lab., 
Inc., 984 F.2d at 1188 (finding sales limited to low volume purchases “may be 
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“experimentation conducted to determine whether the inven-
tion would suit a particular customer’s purposes does not fall 
within the experimental use exception.”166 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As Learned Hand noted, “it is a condition upon an inven-
tor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery 
competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content 
himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.”167 This lan-
guage reflects the public policy interest underlying the com-
mercial exploitation prong of the public-use bar. As it stands 
though—and as this Article aims to demonstrate—the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisprudence does little more than allow one to com-
pare their (or a client’s) practices of interest to those the Feder-
al Circuit has found (usually in dicta) to constitute commercial 
exploitation. Recall in Woodlands Trust, the Federal Circuit 
upheld the patent, but commented that the use of an irrigation 
system by a commercial greenhouse for more than a year prior 
to the critical date could constitute commercial exploitation (as-
suming evidence of sufficient weight, not before the court).168 
Similarly, in D.L. Auld, the Federal Circuit invalidated a 
method claim because the patentee had offered to sell—prior to 
the critical date—a device manufactured using the patented 
method.169 Another circumstance that emerges is failure to no-
tify customers of the experimental nature of the product being 
provided.170 And, of course, “[a]n offer to mass produce produc-
                                                          
relevant to determining whether the scope of the inventor’s testing was appro-
priate but only where other evidence indicates that the sales were restricted 
and controlled as appropriate for experimental use”). 
 166. Atlanta Attachment Co., 516 F.3d at 1366; see also Paragon Podiatry 
Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d at 1188 (finding that because “Paragon represented to doc-
tors and their patients that the [devices] were fully tested” the experimental 
use did not apply and the invention was considered on sale). In rejecting gaug-
ing customer satisfaction with an invention through sales, the Federal Circuit 
noted that “there [is] no reason to be concerned about customer relations if the 
[experimental] devices prove[ ] unsatisfactory” and determined that marketing 
testing of the invention is not included in the experimental use exception. Id. 
 167. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 168. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 169. D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983). 
 170. Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. 
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tion models does not square with experimentation under any 
standard; it is commercial exploitation.”171 
So where does that leave commercial exploitation when the 
case law revolves around a sale of the invention or a disclosure 
to the public? Or in the experimental use context, where the 
primary purpose of a sale must be for experimentation, but ex-
perimentation may include commercial promotion so long as 
the experimentation is not primarily for marketing purposes? 
Commercial exploitation has to be more than a “magic trump 
card” discretionarily used to discipline inventors that cross an 
invisible line.172 Perhaps a more certain (better) approach 
would be for the Federal Circuit to define commercial exploita-
tion, or at least catalogue its “approved” list of factors that in-
form the commercial exploitation determination. Given the 
public policy concerns embodied in the § 102(b) statutory bar, it 
is unlikely that commercial exploitation should require that the 
invention be on sale or even that a revenue stream can be di-
rectly traced to an inventor’s use of the invention. 
However, in the same way that the on-sale bar currently 
has vitiated the commercial exploitation analysis under the 
public-use bar, we must be careful to not vitiate the on-sale bar 
through our definition. Thus, commercial exploitation concerns 
under the public-use bar should be most acute in the context of 
pre-sale marketing activities. Suppose a university laboratory, 
in an effort to find a corporate sponsor through technology 
transfer, invites several industry players to individually attend 
demonstrations of its ready-for-patenting invention. Even 
though the demonstrations are not experimental and all confi-
dentiality and invention-control criteria have been met, the 
systematic demonstrations objectively prove a purpose of com-
mercial exploitation and should implicate the public-use bar. 
Considering that the inventors can simply apply for a patent to 
protect themselves, a definition of commercial exploitation that 
includes such targeted pre-sale marketing activities is not dra-
                                                          
Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1214–15 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 171. Atlanta Attachment Co., 516 F.3d at 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also 
Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 20 (1939) (“The ordinary 
use of a machine or the practise [sic] of a process in a factory in the usual 
course of producing articles for commercial purposes is a public use.”). 
 172. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 61 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s failure to articu-
late their actual standard of scrutiny and instead using “rationality review, 
traditionally little more than a rubber stamp . . . to invalidate badly motivated 
laws”). 
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conian and furthers the public-policy interests embodied in the 
public-use bar. What more is required such that the test for 
commercially exploitative public use is distinct from the on-sale 
bar? Courts offer little in the way of a definition and are in 
danger of conflating the two separate bars. Perhaps they simp-
ly know commercial exploitation when they see it.173 Regard-
less, the Federal Circuit should endeavor to demarcate the 
bounds of commercial exploitation as soon as the opportunity 
presents itself and in so doing provide much needed guidance to 
innovators, practitioners, and the district courts. 
 
                                                          
 173. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (struggling to define a workable standard for obscenity that does not de-
generate into case-by-case review of the material and facts by appellate courts, 
duplicating the efforts of trial courts). 
